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We agree with many points raised by Jones and Love, but do not think that their taxonomy captures the most important division between different Bayesian approaches, and we question their optimism regarding the promise of the Enlightened Bayesian approach.   

In our view, the critical distinction between Bayesian models is whether they are being used as a tool or a theory, what we have called the Methodological and Theoretical Bayesian approaches, respectively (Bowers & Davis, submitted).   According to the Methodological approach, Bayesian models are thought to provide a measure of optimal performance that serves as a benchmark against which to compare actual performance.  Researchers adopting this perspective highlight how often human performance is near optimal, and such findings are held to be useful for constraining a theory (whatever algorithm the mind uses, it needs to support behaviour that approximates optimal performance).  But there is no commitment to the claim that the algorithms that support perception, cognition, and behaviour approximate Bayesian computations. 

By contrast, according to the Theoretical approach, the mind is claimed to carry out (or closely approximate) Bayesian analyses at the algorithmic level; this perspective can be contrasted with the view that the mind is a rag-bag of heuristics.  For example, when describing the near optimal performance of participants in making predictions about uncertain events, Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) write:  “These results are inconsistent with claims that cognitive judgments are based on non-Bayesian heuristics”.

Unfortunately, it is not always clear whether theorists are adopting the Methodological or the Theoretical approach, and at times, theorists adopt different approaches in different contexts.  Nevertheless, this is the key distinction that needs to be appreciated in order to understand what claims are being advanced, as well as to evaluate theories.  That is, if Bayesian models are used as a tool to constrain theories, then the key question is whether this tool provides constraints for theorizing above and beyond previous methods.  By contrast, if the claim is that performance is supported by Bayesian-like algorithms, then it is necessary to show that Bayesian theories are more successful than  non-Bayesian theories.  

In our view there are two main problems with the Methodological Bayesian approach.  First, the extent to which Bayesian models provide measures of optimality is compromised by the fact that the models are often constrained by performance.  For instance, Weiss, Simoncelli, and Adelson (2002) developed a Bayesian model of motion perception that accounts for an illusion of speed:  Objects appear to move more slowly under reduced or low contrast conditions.   In order to accommodate these findings, Weiss et al. assumed that objects tend to move slowly in the world, and this prior plays a more important role under poor viewing conditions.  One problem with this account, however, is that there are other conditions under which objects appear to move more quickly than they really are (Thompson et al., 2006).  Stocker and Simoncelli’s (2006) response to this problem is to note that their Bayesian theory of speed perception could account for the latter phenomenon as well: 

…  if our data were to show increases in perceived speed for low-contrast high-speed stimuli, the Bayesian model described here would be able to fit these behaviors with a prior that increases at high speeds.

The modification of Bayesian models in response to the data is widespread, and this renders the models more as descriptions of behaviour than as tools with which to measure optimality.

Second, even if a Bayesian model provides a good measure of optimal performance, it is not clear how the tool contributes to constraining theories.  Under these conditions, a model can be supported or rejected because it does or does not match optimal performance as determined by the Bayesian model, or more simply, a model can be supported or rejected because it does or does not capture human performance.  The match or mismatch to data is sufficient to evaluate the model – the extra step of showing that it does or does not support optimal performance is superfluous.

With regards to the Theoretical Bayesian approach, the key question is whether a Bayesian model does a better job in accounting for behavior compared to non-Bayesian alternatives.   However, this is rarely considered.  Instead, proponents of this approach take the successful predictions of a Bayesian model as support for their approach, and often ignore the fact that alternative non-Bayesian theories might account for the data just as well.   We are not aware of any psychological data that better fit a Bayesian as compared to a non-Bayesian alternative.  

What about the promise of the Bayesian Enlightenment approach?  On our reading, this perspective encompasses both  theories that we would call Methodological (e.g., the adaptive heuristic approach of Gigerenzer and colleagues are considered Enlightened), and theories that we would call Theoretical (e.g., demonstrations that Bayesian computations can be implemented in neural wetware are considered Enlightened).   Thus, the above criticisms apply to the Bayesian Enlightenment approach as well.

For example, with regards to Enlightened theories that take the form of heuristics, it is not clear that Bayesian models are providing any constraints.  For example, we are not aware of any instance in which Gigerenzer and colleagues used a Bayesian model in order to constrain their adaptive solution, and we are not sure how in practice this could help in the future.   The underlying processes of Bayesian models and heuristics are as different as could be, and unless there are cases in which a Bayesian model provides important constraints on heuristic theories above and beyond the data, we do not see the point.  

With regards to Enlightened models of neural computation, there is no evidence that neurons actually compute in a Bayesian manner.  Almost all the evidence taken to support this view is behavioral, with the computational neuroscience largely devoted to providing existence proofs that Bayesian computations in brain are possible.  Accordingly, alternative computational solutions might equally account for the relevant data.  More generally, Jones et al. argue that an Englightened Bayesian model looks for optimal solutions given a set of representations and processes.  However, we are unclear how this approach adds to the more traditional approach to science, namely, evaluating how well a specific implemented model accounts for performance.

